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Abstract : The paper is an attempt to quantify some macroeconomic behaviours in the 
Ethiopian economy. The aim is to provide a better understanding of the challenges to the 
Ethiopian transition from war and command economy to peace and market-oriented one. 
We all are princes in exile. 
But for some of us ir is Hell. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1. At the eve of the 1990s and the end of the civil war (May 1991), Ethiopia is in & 
conditions. Per capita income is lower than in 1965 revealing a population which is one of the 
most destituted in the world. Further, it has lxen denied human rights as it is most generally 
the case within the Thirld World. The population has suffered from the marxist regime ruling 
Ethiopia since 1974 and it has been affected by recurrent droughts since 1972-73. Poverty, 
adverse demographic dynamics and misguided or frankly wrong agriculture policy have 
increased soil degradation which has become a permanent fact during Haile Selassie’s reign 
and after. As a result of this set of factors food production per -pita has dramatically 
declined. It reaches the value of SS’:i”in 1989 (1979-81=100) which has to be compared to 
97.6 fifteen to twenty years ago and 109.6 twenty-five to thirty years ago. So, westerners 
have become accustomed to; see on their television screens Ethiopian people dying from 
starvation. 
2. The country has now to be rehabilitated but the government has no more money. It owes a 
debt of more than US$ 3 billion to western donors and between US$ 5 to 6 billion to the late 
USSR. The government has proposed an Emergency and Reconstruction Program to the 
international donors community. It has asked its ERP to be financed at a rate of 92 per cent at 
least. To cure Ethiopia from poverty, food supply shortage, insufficient growth rate, backward 
technology and methods of cultivation, non competitive and non profitable activities, lack of 
jobs and so on...the government has published a yellow booklet (November 21, 1991) on 
Ethiopia Economic Policy during the Transition Period ie from 1991 to 1993. The EPTP is 3 
. . . . cure peace anQ&mxroecQnnrnrc stablilzatlon. selected toc&xr.e 
. . . t case and 111 the second. Up to now (July 1992), the 
EPTP has not given rise to many measures of implementation. %&xt likely because the 
government has to act on two fronts, the political and the economic ones. The first one is the 
most constraining for the moment. Civil war has indeed come back in some parts of the 
country. But maybe also because the government is weak. It groups market and marxist 
reformists, mainly, so that both the EPTP and the political commitments to implement it result 
from a modus vivendi between the dominant groups. And moreover, although, it resembles 
winners who have overthrown the late DERG-regime, it lacks from legitimacy in front of the 
Ethiopian population. To improve its position, it acts along lines of faith, ethnicity and 
langage rather than that of political cohesion and economic rationality. So, the risks of getting 
a blue print reform or EPTP are very high till the free elections announced for mid-1993. 
3. The international donors community is very much worried about Ethiopian perspectives. 
Indeed, in case of failure, it would have to provide increased food, medical care etc...to 
million of people. Already now there are more than 9 million people at risk of famine in the 
country. There is also a risk of political explosion of the all Horn of Africa if peace cannot be 
secured in Ethiopia. Economic concern on Ethiopia has led the EC to contract a Paris-based 
study group to get a better appreciation of what could be further financed by the EC to help 
the country to recover. To permit the drafting of a pertinent, relevant and consistent analytical 
report, a mission to Addis Ababa of the working team took place on March 22 to April 3, 
. . . . . . . 1992. Beyond the -t-ted to collect, the need to ” . 1, auantlfv 
bhe 
revealed. This is illuminated a little bit through the next paragraphs. 
4. Market functionigg is a bit on expected market-oriented behaviours. It presumes a lot of 
basic conditions to be fullfilled. For instance, a market requires a surplus of production 
otherwise there would not be any sellers. And also some saving availability otherwise there 
are no buyers. These conditions are not satisfied in Ethiopia for the moment given the level of 
poverty. Indeed, 60 per cent of the population (rural and urban) lives with US$ 35 per year 
and person. This is largely beyond the poverty line determined by the World Bank (US$ 90). 
With regard to the surplus of production, it is of 18 gr per person and month under normal 
circumstances (ie rainfalls). So, a market presumes to be beyond some established poverty 
line and level of basic food supply. This normally leads the analyst of the Ethiopian question 
to conclude that poverty has to be adressed as such when one asks how to improve the 
. economy of the country. Povert.y&ould then be an Issue tackled with tv a 
. . t fuw . Both overlaps as previously indicated. Very surprisingly the EPTP does 
not advocate the alleviation of poverty as such. It accounts for a change to poverty through a 
modification to the economy functioning. So, poverty is a residue while it has its own 
dynamics which cannot be synthetised only through market functioning. It is that of income- 
demography differentials although the EPTP evacuates from the analysis demographic trends. 
This is quite paradoxical if one accounts for the budget deficit which likely will hinder growth 
and the expected market promotion. Taxes are no more collected, contraband and smuggling 
increase, informal in the sense of unregistered activities dominate the markets of the big and 
medium cities. The government has not the money to boost growth whatever the functioning 
of the economy is or is expected to be. So, bad previously introduced (paragraph 1) might 
well become worse. Then macro stabilization could very well mean at best a zero growth rate 
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of real GDP. This would mean a decrease of living standard of a population which increases 
by about 3 per cent per year. The preceding pleads for the estimation of consumption 
functions where the influence of a lot of factors, population, for instance, are explicitly 
measured. 
5. Another example concerns the Bin parity . The World Bank pleads for a modification ie a 
devaluation of the Birr linked to the US$ without any change since February 1973. This with 
the aim to boost growth either through increased competitiveness (a reduction of Ethiopian 
price in foreign currency) or an increase of the domestic price of the export-oriented sector 
compared to the rest of the economy. All this in the framework of rationalized investment 
decision through import price increase. Although the Ethiopian government has put this 
question on its agenda, it has delayed it, explaining it needed careful investigation of 
alternative measures. Such a legitime cautious behaviour given the complexity of the question 
could have some non negligible costs. For instance, these of private operators remaining on a 
waiting position being convinced that the government has no other choice but to accept the 
WB’s plea. This controversial issue must normally lead the analyst to carefully look at a set of 
elasticities linking Ethiopian externai’trade to world trade and price, domestic income and 
prices and the exchange rate. Further, it leads him to distinguish between different sorts of 
convertibility of which an adequate exchange rate is one of the required conditions. To 
conclude, when coming back f.%om ission, the need to use some econometrics to do the EC 
contracted work properly appeared. So, an econometric investigation of some economic 
channels was performed although the time constraint was high. The final report was expected 
by end of July 1992. The time constraint has not permitted us to apply solutions to the 
. . econometric and statistical problems encountered. Theresult of e-trrc m vestigation 
. 
not a model to be used at the purpose of amulatron ~ a model structue 
more or less apw. Indeed, the statistical sources which were used, published by the JMF 
and the WB, reveal inconsistencies in real terms when simultaneously referred to. To be 
precise enough, real terms data show oddness when deflators measured by the WB were 
applied on IMFs current price data. Further, we have been led to select equations where’there 
was multicollinearity amongst explanatory variables. So, although the results we present may 
appear to be relevant, some are biased because of the multicollinearity and statistical 
discrepancies. Very often, nevertheless, we have tried to indicate’the nature of the bias 
encountered. Moreover, we have indicated what could be an econometric solution to the 
multicollinearity question. To conclude we are aware that our results plead for further 
research. 
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ECONOMET RIC INVESwc . 
I-l) THE DATA BASE: 
6. To estimate some relevant functions, data in current and constant prices (US$ and Birr) 
have been used. 
ta (coming from the Yearbook) 
l- National accounts of Ethiopia (current Sir-r) ; 
2- The private consumption deflator (1985 as base-year) ; 
3- The treasury bill rate (%) ; 
4- World trade (from the export side) in current US$ ; 
5- World trade (export) unit value (1985 as base-year) in US$ also ; 
6- Some relevant commodity price as the coffee one and that of hides and skins, both are in 
.I, .a, 
current US$ ; I: 
7- The international transactions (merchandise only) of Ethiopia, (level in current Sir-r) and 
the export volume (1985 as base-year) ; 
8- The exchange rate : price in Birr of one US$ ; 
9- The level of population (midyear estimate) ; 
lo- Money demand (Ml: current Sir-r) ; 
ll- The reserves (current Birr) ; 
- World (coming from the World Tables) 
lo- The GDP deflator (1980 as base year) ; 
ll- The import prices (1980 as base year) ; 
Data coming from the IMP’s yearbook with 1985 as base year have been transformed, into 
data with 1980 as base year so as to be on line with World Bank’s data. Inconsistency occurs 
when comparing GDP in current price (IMP’s source) deflated by‘ the GDP price index 
measured by the WB to private consumption in real terms (where both current price data and 
the deflator come from the IMP’s source). The result was a negative amount for the period 
1960-74 contrarily to any economic rationality. To solve this problem, we also computed 
private consumption in real production terms ie deflated by the GDP price index when 
estimating some consumption functions. 
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7. Data used cover the period 1960 to 1990. This not only to benefit from good statistical 
properties but also at the aim to get some quantitative analysis of the transition in the light of 
three periods: 
l- 1960 to 1974 ie during the market regime of Haile Selassie ; 
2- 1974 to 1990 ie during the marxist regime of the DERG ; 
3- 1960 to 1990 ie at long run. 
The idea was, indeed, to discover what were the market parameters of Ethiopia before 1974 
and so the private operators’ behaviours, and how they were modified during the non-market 
period (1974-90). This helps to speculate a little on what could be the new Ethiopian market 
parameters ie those which could feature the promoted market-based economy after the end of 
the civil war. The data bank does not cover the period of 1960 to 1990 for the all set of data. 
. were t-generated bv the SORITFC softwm used to ea . eaum . 
This solution was applied because there was no time enough to wait for more data coming 
from Addis Ababa. Missing data were for: 
l- the private consumption deflator : years 1960 to 1964 ; 
2- the treasury bill rate (%) : years 1960 to 1977 ; 
3- the import price:index : years 1960 to 67 and 1989 to 90 ; 
4- the coffee commodity price : year 1990. 
MaChine computed data substituted for missing data were accepted only after cautious 
investigation. 
I-2) THE MACROECONOMIC STRUCI’URE: 
8. During the estimation process, the focus was mainly on a macroeconometric model for 
developing countries proposed by an IMFs team conducted by P.J. Montiel(l). It is a small 
macroeconometric model of the Mundell-Flemming variety with one domestically produced 
good consumed both at home and abroad and one imported good. It allows for the existence of 
capital controls, while permitting the degree of effective capital mobility to be tested 
empirically. The to focus on su!&-momodel . . . . . was to enlighten srtuatron & 
ewo&. But 
this framework was not always relevant for Ethiopia. This led us to present a set of other 
results which got more plausibility. 
(1) - “A Macroeconometric model for developing countries” by N. U. Haque, K Luhiri, P.J. Montiel. 
IMF Staffpaper, ~0137, n”3, Sept 1990. 
- i%e model was applied to the following set of countries : Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecu&or, 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Greece, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Jamaka, Jordan, Kenya, The Republic of &rea, Malawi, 
Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Morocca, Nigeria, Paraguay, the Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, 
Tunisia, Venezuela and Zambia. 
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I-3) THE METHOD OF ESTIMATION : 
9. Parameters were estimated by OLS. They were selected according to a set of statistical 
criteria including the analysis of multicollinearity very often neglected. In this later case the 
correlation matrix was referred to to speculate on multicollinearity being well aware that it is 
much more complex than single correlation analysis. Functions were tested in level, log form, 
difference in level, percentage and relevant ratios. Both current and constant Birr data were 
used. Only the most significant and/or promising results are presented and commented. All the 
results have been transformed into elasticities to ease comparison. They are accompanied by 
four statistics : 
(i) R2 adjusted for the number of observations and that of the explanatory variables ; 
(ii) the Durbin-Watson “d” statistics ; 
(iii) the Durbin “h” statistics in case of the lagged explained variable being amongst the 
explanatory ones(2) ;
(iv) the significance level of the Student ‘7” statistics. 
When autocorrelation was detected results were corrected using the Cochrane Orcutt method 
(CO). .I: 
II-THE 
H-l) PRIVATE CONSUMPTION : 
10. The consumption functions have been specified via three models : A, B and C. Model B 
comes from the reference framework although referring to per capita aggregates at the 
opposite of the reference equation. 
(A) L(C/pc)t = Constant + alL(Y/p)t t a2it t a3Nt 
(B) L(CN)t = a4L(YN)t t a5L(YN)t-l + Art-1 + a’lL(CN)t-1 
(C) CNt = Constant t aSYNt t a9YNt-1 t alOrt-1 t allCNt-1 + al2(pdp)t 
Where the symbols stand for : 
-L :Logform; 
-- 1 : Lagged variable ; 
-c : Private consumption (current Sir-r) ; 
(2) The reader has to refer to the normal distribution to fuld the significance level of the test in this case. 
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-PC : Private consumption deflator ; 
- C/PC : Private consumption in real terms ; 
-Y : GDP in current Birr ; 
-P : GDP deflator ; 
- Y/p : GDP in real terms ; 
-N : Level of the population (million) ; 
-i : Nominal treasury bill rate (%) ; 
-CN : Private consumption per capita at production price ie deflated by the GDP price 
index ; 
-YN : GDP per capita in real terms ; 
- PC/P : Relative consumption price ; 
-r : Real interest rate ie the nominal treasury bill rate (%) minus the inflation one being 
proxied by the change of the GDP deflator in %. 
The three models permit to enlighten the influences on private consumption of permanent 
income, the liquidity constraint on households, population, the interest rate and open trade. 
. . . . Put it another way tl@ impacts of D’k;;;lanent 
. . rberallzatlon. Parameters related to m income are biased. Indeed, one 
shomd have computed GDP minus income taxes instead of GDP alone. This was not possible 
given the availability of data related to income taxes. The bias is likely not very high. Indeed, 
peasants pay a fixed tax of 10 Birr for annual income not exceeding 600 Birr. Income above 
that amount is taxed on a progressive basis. The taxation cannot very much bias the 
permanent income effect when one remembers that in W a peasant on average earns only 
. 3.92 Bin: with 60 per cent of the peasantry getting only US$35 a year. So. 
. . whr&nflues on the p-e of 80 oer cent of the labour ~QQX 
working that SectQUSmodest, 
11. The results of model (A) are shown in Table 1. The related comments are as follows : 
(i) The income elasticity is clearly too high (higher than one) particularly for the periods 
, 1960-90 and 1974-90. This is likely due to the inconsistency noted between the deflators 
used (pc and p) and the multicollinearity between income and the constant term. Indeed, the 
bias reduces on 1974-90 period for which there is no more inconsistency between pc and p 
and no relevant constant term in the equation. 
(ii) At long run, the elasticity with respect to population increases from -0.10 to -0.14 as 
normally expected given the increase of the fertility rate&) (1975 : 5.9% ; 1989 : 7.5%) the 
(3) -a. Defined as births per woman. 
CONSUMPTION 
TABLE 1. RESULTS OF MODEL A - PRIVATE CONSUMPTION IN REAL TERMS - RELEVANT ELASTICITIES AND PARAMETER (P) 
1 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 1960-90 1960-74 197690 
CONSTANT (P) 
INCOME 
INTEREST RATE 
POPULATION 
-3.83 (0.1%) 
(3*3w - 1.60 (0.0%) 7:: (0.0%) 1.16 (0.0%) 
-0.03 (7.2%) -0.03 (16.6%) 
-0.14 (0.0%) -0.10 (9.8%) -0.13 (0.0%) 
I 
FQ (Adj) ._ 
D-W 
Multicollinearity bitween: 
0.89 0.97 
2.14 1.31 
income & constant (CO) income & constant (~0) 
int. rate & constant (>o) income 81 population (CO) 
int. rate 81 income (4) population & constant (3) 
1.00 
2.57 
int. rate & income (-cO) 
int. rate & population (<o) 
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decrease of the mortality one(3b) (1975 : 151.4 ; 1989 : 133.2) and the real income average 
percentage change (+1.5% on 1960-74 but -0.8% for 1974-90). 
(iii) The influence of the nominal interest rate is low (elasticity of -0.03) and not significant 
on period 1960-74. This is likely because of the & interest rate values although increasing 
during this period. So, private operators have adjusted to the interest rate slowly but 
significantly as time has been running : thus more on 1974-90 than on 1960-74 because of 
increased inflation and repressed nominal income (frozen wage since 1975). 
12. The results of model (B) where both the private consumption and the income values have 
been deflated by the same production prices are shown in Table 2. The model is very rich in 
the sej;se that it permits to test for several theoretical frameworks which may feature the 
consumption expenditure. The model includes the past value of private consumption. m 
. to test the Simplest wl978) versron of the permanent Income hy&s is with no 
. . . . 
vconstramts. The theory of 7 which is due to Milton Friedman argues 
that people gear rationaly their consumption behaviour, This means people optimalize their 
expenditure on several periods according to their permanent income with this one being 
defined as the quantity they can consume leaving their wealth unchanged. Then, Milton 
Friedman distinguishes between permanent and effective income as between permanent and 
effective consumption. Effective aggregates include some transitory ‘ones to be added to 
permanent ones. The ratio of permanent consumption to permanent income does not depend 
on permanent income but it can be influenced by the interest rate, the wealth to permanent 
income ratio, the age of the consumer, how the incomes are distributed around some average 
etc...Further, he adds that there is no correlation between permanent and transitory income, as 
between permanent and transitory consumption or between transitory income and 
consumption. The later aggregates are nul on average. Milton Friedman’s .idea is appealing but 
it leaves two further questions. The first concerns the precise relationship between current 
consumption and permanent income. The second is how to make the concept of permanent 
income operational, that is, how to measure it. These questions are resolved in a pragmatic 
way by assuming that: 
I (i) effective consumption (ie the permanent one since the transitory aggregate is nul) is 
permanently proportional to permanent income (C=CYp) ; 
(ii) permanent income is related to the behaviour of current and past income (YP=XriYt-i ; 
O<tcl). 
In this framework, the simplest hypothesis of permanent income with no liquidity constraint 
due to Hall is to test that all coefficients equal zero except the lagged consumption one (a7+0, 
only). If only the disposable income terms are rejected empirically then the specification 
(3) -b. Defined as per thousand live births. 
,- 
CONSUMPTION 
” 
TABLE 2. RESULTS OF MODEL B - REAL CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA - RELEVANT ELASTICITIES 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES I 
1960-90 1960-74 1974-90 
CONSUMPTlON(-I) 0.91 (0.0%) 0.82 (0.0%) 0.86 
INCOME 
(0.0%) 
1.02 (0.0%) 1.11 (0.0%) 0.97 (0.0%) 
INCOME -0.94 (0.0%) XI.94 (0.0%) -0.83 
REAL INTEREST RATE(-1) 
(0.0%) 
0.0001 (O.o%) -0.ooo7 (0.7%) 0.0009 (0.0%) 
R2 (Adj) ‘1. 
D-W 
D-H 
Multicollinearity between: 
1 .oo 
2.11 
-0.47 
iEiQQ0d V&tbteS (<o) 
1.q 1.00 
2.42 1.97 
-1.15 -0.19 
lagged variables (4) lagged variables (4) 
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would be consistent with more genera1 Euler-equation approaches, which predict that, in the 
absence of new information, consumption grows from period to period at a rate that depends 
on the interest one (Rossi 1988 ; Giovannini 1985). Model B including the income variable 
. . lagged one year permits to test &Q for ] 
age&s. Indeed, as shown in Haque (1988) if the planning horizons of households that do not 
face liquidity constraints is effectively of finite length a5=0; otherwise it is negative. 
13. Comments are the following : 
(i) Estimations indicate that the Hall hypothesis has to be rejected for the three periods, 
Indeed, the coefficient of current income is always statistically significant. The coefficient of 
the lagged income indicates that 94 per cent of households were permanently liquidity 
constrained at long run (1960-90). Very surprisingly this percentage reduces on 1974-90 
featured by frozen wage. Although relevant, these results are likely biased for the 
multicollinearity existing between the lagged variables. 
(ii) Another econometrical weakness is the value of current income elasticity which is 
slightly too high ie greater than one on 1960-74 as it was the caserwith model (A) for the 
three periods. Nevertheless some economic rationality could very well explain why to get an 
income elasticity greater than one on 1960-74 or at least higher than that for 1974-90. The 
credit market policy and the saving ratio evolution could explain this. On 1960-74, private 
saving ratio increased creating a permanent wealth effect or a positive transitory income one 
at about zero real interest rate. On this period, moreover, the credit policy was not prejudicing 
households. This scenario was reversed on 1974-90 : wages were frozen since 1975 with an 
acceleration of inflation (average percentage change of the GDP deflator - 1974-80 : +5.7% ; 
1980-90 : +2.0%). As a result, real income decreased. Further, the credit market was 
managed against private interests and the nominal interest rate was not adjusted for inflation. 
As a result gross domestic saving reduced from 43.6 per cent from 1973 to 80 and still 6.6 per 
cent from 1980 to 90. The preceding leads to a relation between income and consumption 
which looks to the relative income hypothesis due to J. Duesenberry. On the basis of this one 
individuals build up consumption standards that are geared to their peak income levels. If 
income declines relative to past income, then individuals will not immediately sacrifice the 
consumption standard they have adopted. There is a ratchet effect and they will only adjust to 
a small extent to the decline in current income. This theory is even n&e relevant when being 
applied to very poor population for which the consumption standard is that of survival. As a 
result the elasticity of private consumption to past consumption increased at the opposite of 
that to current income. That can be noticed through the 1974-90 equation compared to the 
1960-74 one. 
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(iii) Contrarily to some studies, for instance that of the IMF already mentioned(4), the interest 
rate (the real one) QQ,&Y&L influes on private consumption per capita except for the period 
1960-74. This indicates some potential positive wealth effect when real interest rate is 
positive on trend. But in the Ethiopian case it is worth indicating that real interest rate is 
negative on trend. So, private consumption is in fact negatively touched by that variable as 
found by the IMFs team@). The change in the elasticity sign on 1974-90 compared to 1960- 
74 is likely due to a modification of households’ adjustment process to the interest rate given 
the change in the income evolution, the appearing of a trend of nerrative real interest rate as to 
the multicollinearity between lagged variables. 
14. The results of model (C) where both the private consumption and the income values have 
also been deflated by the same production prices are shown in Table 3. Here, the ratio of the 
private consumption deflator to the GDP one has been introduced at the aim to test for 
something related to price liberalization, pc being an open market measure (of Addis Ababa, 
only). The results are rather analogous to those of model (B) except in level : income and past 
consumption elasticities decrease at the opposite of these to the real interest rate. Only the real 
income elasticity of 1960-74 remains slightly higher than one. Further the. parameters related .:: 
to 1960-90 belong generally (the exception being the interest rate elasticity) to an .interval 
determined by the parameters of the two other periods. The model indicates that: 
. ., 
(i) at long run (1960-90) 2(5 per cent of the households llqm 
. . . * . of bte length . -eases &ghtl~ as would 
normally be expected given the real income decrease of that period and contrarily to model 
(B). These percentages are very high compared to the IMFs study (15 percent of consumers in 
developing countries are liquidity constrained). These percentages are rather closed to the 
weight of agriculture in the labour force (+80%). This is quite consistent with the income 
distribution. Indeed, the gross purchasing power in agriculture in 1989 is 292 Birr per year 
and person to be compared to 922 in the industry sector (10% of the labour force) and 1145 in 
the services one (also 10% of the labour force). So, 80 per cent of the labour force get only 
about 40 per cent of GDP further within that group 60% earn only 72 Birr (US$35) per year 
and person. 
(ii) There was a real ~Q,Q.& wealth&ect or tm QII 1960-74 at the opposite of 
1974-90. As a result the 1974-90 average elasticity to consume increased (from 0.6 to 0.79) 
at the opposite of that to current income (from 1.03 to 0.93 : ratchet effect of the Duesenberry 
tYPeI* 
(4) Refer to (I) 
CONSUMPTION 
TABLE 3. RESULTS OF MODEL C - REAL CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA - RELEVANT ELASTICITIES AND PARAMETER (P) 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES w6o-90 I. 1960-74 1974-90 \ 
CONSTANT (P) 
CONSUMPTION(-1) INCOME 
INCOME 
REAL INTEREST RATE(-1) 
REL. CONSUMPTION. PRICE 
13.66 (7.7%) 12.29 
0.74 
KY 
(13.4%) 
0.60 
(o:oYI) KY 
0.79 0.91 
1.03 
(0.0%) 
0.93 -0.70 -0.69 (0.0%) - .72 
0.0005 
(0.0%) 
(0.6;) 
-0.004 
(0.0%) 
0.005 -0.03 (1.2%) (0.6%) (0.0%) 
R2 WI) 
D-W 
D-H ‘. Multlcollln&dty betwe&: 
0.97 
2.06 
-0.26 
consumption(-1) & lncome(-l) (CO) 
const. 8 rd. consumption price (4) 
0.97 
2.27 
-1.04 
consurri@on(-1) 8 Income (~0) 
consumption(-1) (L constant (4) 
income & constant (~0) 
1.00 
1.68 
0.04 
consumptlon(-1) 8 income (4) 
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(iii) The impact of the real interest rate is given by a positive parameter except for 1960-74 
indicating some positive potential wealth effect in case of positive real interest rate. So, as 
long as real interest rate has remained negative (nominal interest rate being not fully adjusted 
. for inflation) *vate cw beuatr ‘velv wd . . bv r-m 
. . rice IS pw on 1974-9Q , the related elasticity is indeed 
multiplied by ten compared to that of 1960-90. The parameters of the interest rate are very 
low in the light of other studies, the IMFs one, for instance (value of -0.08). ‘Ihis is a 
reflection of poverty featuring Ethiopia. An interest rate is a monetary indicator, the more it 
influes on the economy, the more important is the monetary sector of that economy. That is 
the opposite in Ethiopia where 60 per cent of the population lives in a barter or non monetary 
economy. This is also due to the fact that the interest rate parameter is the result of two 
behaviours that of households being liquidity constrained, 70 per cent of households, and that 
of households (30 per cent) rich enough to get some saving. In the first case, the expected 
impact of the interest rate on consumption is negative and what matters the most is nominal 
interest rate. In the second case, it is positive, and real interest rate matters. A potential 
positive wealth effect is expected as long as nominal interest rate is adjusted for inflation. This 
reasoning can be illuminated a littler&e by trying to measure the relevant elasticities for the 
two groups of households. In this framework, the elasticity of money demand to the nominal 
interest rate was used to feature households which face liquidity constraints. So, one writes an 
equation where the elasticity of the relatively rich households to the real interest rate is the 
unknown departing from the elasticities of the demand for money and consumption to the 
interest rate and weights featuring the shares of rich and poor households in income in 
conjunction with that of households being liquidity constrained. 
One writes : 
73 = (EDM * IS * HS ) + [ x * (l-IS) * (l-HS)] 
Where: 
- t3 = 0.0005 (from table 3, period 1960-90) ; 
-EDM= -1.00 : long run money demand elasticity to the nominal interest rate (see on 
page 52) ; 
- IS, l-IS = poor and rich households’ shares in income (40 and 60 per cent respectively) ; 
- HS, l-HS = poor and rich households’ shares in front of the liquidity constraint (70 and 
30 per cent respectively). ,, .* 
As result one gets a long run consumption elasticity of rich households to the real interest rate 
of 1.56. 
(iv) At there is a negativeiact of the relative consumption price on the rem 
households 1 
. 
expenditure. It is almost 170 timesan tha 
. t of the real n&rest rak. It 
occured on the 1960-90 period only for a difference between the average change in 
percentage of the used deflators only occured in 1974-90: 
15. Model (C) ie the equation specified for 1960-90 was selected to simulate very roughly the 
impacts of adverse demographic dynamics on private consumption assuming macro 
. stabilization would keep constant real income. Under such a circumstance, the 
. . . 
&owh of 3 Der F vea would reduce the noDulatlond bv 2.79% . This 
. . . . indicates W noverty IS an rssue to be treatedas sucti anv po&v document . The selected 
equation also shows that - u pz!icy of price deregulation would much more touch the 
. households than that of positive interest rate : a 170 times higher elasticity. So, a p.o& 
. . . . e would favQllLpnce stw of v 
II-2) INVESTMEhT : 
16. The investment equation was specified as follows : 
It = Bl (Yh)t + 82 (Y&It-1 + 83 CSRBt-2 + 84 it-3 + @5 (Y/PI&-l + pat-1 
where : 
-1 : Fixed investment in capital in constant Birr ; 
-- 1 : Lagged variable ; 
- Y/p : Gross Domestic Product in constant Birr ; 
-aRB :CumuIated Sum of the country Resource Balance (i-e exports minus imports) 
in constant Birr ; 
-i : The treasury bill rate (%) ; 
- Y/pL : Labour productivity i.e GDP (constant Birr) divided by total labour force. 
It was substituted for the reference one for this one did not fit the Ethiopian data properly. The 
reference equation was specified as follows : 
It= f(rt,(Y/p)tKt-1) 
and estimated in first differences to eliminate the capital stock, a variable for which no 
developing country data are available. Our specified equation is a very rich relationship. 
Indeed, it permits to account for an acceleration effect via the GDP variable, a bidity one 
via the cumulated sum of the country resource balance, a w one via the interest rate 
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and a Drofit one via the labour productivity. Further, the liquidity variable permits also to cope 
. with extort and imporI policies as with 5 @ rice 
effects included). And finally, the lagged GDP variable in conjunction with the lagged 
explained variable reveals an adjustment process through which the country’s capital stock is 
accounted for(s). Data used cover only the period 1968-88 due to the lack of investment data 
in constant Birr from 1960 to 68. The results are shown at table 4. Given the length of the data 
series used (1968-88) it was no more possible to study the three periods (1960-90; 1960-74; 
1974-90). We then decided to indicate also the results for 1974-90 just to verify wether the 
estimated relationship was robust enough. 
17. Comments are as follows : 
(i) As normally expected, results indicate a very high long run elasticity to real current 
production or income (about 5.4) but it is reduced via the capital stock impact (about -4.5). 
This leads to an income elasticity of about one which is of the same magnitude as that found 
by the IMF’s team (1.02). 
(ii) The impact of the nominal interest rate (with a 3 years lag) is high : elasticity of about - .I. .,I 
1.5 ie nearly three times as big as the IMFs one. It is higher but with an opposite sign than the 
liquidity and the profit ones (about +OS and one). 
(iii) The interest rate and the profitability elasticities are a reflection of a country where 
smallholders and poverty prevail. Indeed, in such a country, the credit policy is a powerful 
tool to stimulate investment because poverty is such a very strong constraint that the 
investment surplus is very low. In this respect, it is not the labour productivity which matters 
but how it is passed on to purchasing power and then to saving. So, the labour productivity 
elasticity implicitly accounts for how the State extracts the income surplus. All this is a 
classical process within developing countries where agriculture smallholders dominate. 
Ethiopia fits perfectly such a scenario. Agriculture is the dominant activity of 80 per cent of 
the population. It is “operated” at 94% by smallholders ; 60% of these ones earn only US$35 
a year. The State extracted mainly the income surplus through the price paid to the peasants 
for their produce. Under the DERG-regime (1974-90), the nominal protection rate i.e the 
ratio of the price paid to the peasants on the world ones has been approximately 40 per cent. 
So, the surplus extraction was 60 per cent on trend. Then, one had also to account for the 
various taxes to be paid. In Ethiopia, this lets approximately 16 per-‘cent for the peasants to 
live and pay for their input costs. 
(5) l7ae capital stock was need&for the estimation of the labour productivity equation. It was computed through 
the perpetual inventory model ie on the basis of the following identities : 
Kt = ZG-l(l4) + It 
or 
K’t = K’t-l(l4) + It-l 
where t and t’ are time it&x indicating the end and the beginning of year t respectively. For more details refer 
to w 
TABLE 4. RELEVANT ELASTICITIES 
EXPANATORY VARIABLES 1968-88 1974-88 
SHORT RUN LONG RUN i- SHORT RUN SHORT RUN 
INVESTMENT 
GDP 
GDP(-1) 
CsRB(-2) 
INTEREST RATE (-3) 
LABOUR PRODUCTlVlN(~) 
0.54 (3.4%) 0.55 - 2.50 5:43 (6.9%) 
2.94 -2.05 6.53 
(lb%) g.;;; -4.46 -2.42 0.21 -6.38 
0.46 0.31 
-0.71 (7.4%) -1.54 -0.81 
0.50 (9.9%) 1.09 
;r;:;; I $ 
0.69 
-1.80 
0.43 (18:1%) 0.93 
R2 (Adj) ._ 
DaJ 
:. 
Multicollinearity between: 
0.98 0.99 
1.65 
” 
2.08 
gdp(-1) 8, gdp (<O) 
labour productivity-l) & CSRB(Z) (CO) 
gdp(-1) a 9dp (~0) 
labour productkity(-I) & Investment (~0) 
gdp(-I) CL investment (4) 
CSRB(2) & investment (~0) 
gdp 81 Investment (a) 
CSRB(Z) & investment (4) 
_. labour producUvity(-I) CL. CSRB(Z) (4) 
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(iv) In the light of all that prec=k, the labour productivity elasticity appears to be a key one 
to get an Ethiopian privatized economy. It indicates that poverty to alleviate is a key to market 
functioning and growth improvment. 
(v) The lag of the interest rate variable is the result of the slow modification of this variable. 
Very often it was kept constant on 2 or 3 years or even more during the 1980s. Further, its 
changes reduce through the DERG-regime ‘s period. 
(vi) The reduced sensitivity (about 0.5) to the cumulated balance of trade (with a 2 years lag) 
is not only a result of the development constraint. Capital and intermediate goods imports are 
needed even when the export commodities cannot enough increase foreign reserves to pay for 
the import bill. In the case of Ethiopia, one has also to account for military imports because of 
wars (with Somalia and between Ethiopian movements). They reduced the elasticity to the 
liquidity variable because the government got credit from the late USSR, mainly, for its 
military expenditure. Within a market economy, the liquidity elasticity would be a key 
indicator. Indeed, it would help to fix an import ceiling to the government. Going over it 
would mean to drain the country’s foreign reserves or further deteriorate the country’s 
indebtness position. It would also increase the budget deficit as the risks of money creation 
and inflation upswir$. 
.,. (I, 
(vii) The investment equation reveals an elasticity to the interest rate higher than for real 
balances (about 1.5 compared to 1.0 in absolute values) at the opposite of the real income ’ 
elasticity (1.0 compared to 2.0)(6). This matters particularly in the framework of an IS-IX 
analysis of the Ethiopian economy. Let us just briefly recall some points of this analysis : 
- The LMcurve is the schedule of combinations of the interest rate and level of real income 
such that the money market is in equilibrium. It is positively sloped. Given the fixed real 
money supply, an increase in the level of income, which increases the demand for money has 
to be accompanied by an increase in the interest rate. This reduces the real demand for money 
and thereby keeps it equal to the real supply. The LM curve is steeper when the elasticity of 
money demand to real income is high compared to the elasticity to the interest rate. When this 
latter is zero , the LM curve is vertical. It is horizontal when the real income elasticity is very 
low. The LM curve is shifted out to the right when real money supply increases at given real 
income. 
- The IS curve is the schedule of combinations of the interest rate and level of real income 
such that the goods market is in equilibrium. It is negatively sloped because an increase in the 
interest rate reduces planned investment spending, therefore it reduces also aggregate demand 
and thus the equilibrium level of income. The less sensitive the investment spending is to 
changes in the interest rate and the lower is the income multiplier, the steeper is the curve. 
Thus, when a given change in the interest rate produces a large change in income, the IS is 
very flat. The IS curve is shifted out to the right by changes in autonomous spending. 
(6) 27iese results comefiom the money demand analysis to which the reader shouZd refer to. 
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The steeper is the LM schedule (low response to the interest rate) and the flatter is the IS 
schedule (high response to the interest rate) the larger will be the change in equilibrium 
income in case of a real money supply increase. The opposite is true in case of an austerity 
monetary policy. The change in equilibrium income is due to the money supply induced 
change to the interest rate. In Ethiopia, the IS is rather flat (investment elasticity of about -1.5 
; real income one of 1.0) and the LM curve steeper (real elasticity of about 2.0 and interest 
. . rate one of about -1.0). -indicates m ease of 1 
. . . . . at the cmt.dmreased poverty. Gma-thd. a SteeDermonevdemand a co- 
. . . v over fiscal wav to reduce addltlonal DOVE 
. . . . would be to :eemDlovment whenaustentvmonetarvy would have 
. . . . . . w IS the good a-Iv bv eettlngate uows would be t& 
. olrcv. Mm 
ad the government reduw 
stronelv. 
(viii) All the precedjng results seem ;;kry robust. Indeed, the 1974438 period doesnot deliver 
rupture of trends. All elasticities increase but likely because of increased multicollinearity. 
II-3) WORLD TRADE: 
EXPORTS: 
18. Exports functions have been estimated for the two main (export) commodities of Ethiopia 
i.e coffee (about 66% of the export total under normal rainfalls) and hides (about 
15%) as for the rest of the package (19%) and for the xxviceS. The equations 
have been specified as follows : 
A- Coffee : 
Xcofvt = Constant + El Xworldt t E2 (Pcoft*Et) _, -a’ 
Xcofvt = E3 Xworldt t E4 (Pcoft/pt) t E5 Et + E6 Xcofvt-1 
Xcoft = E7 Xworldt + ES Pcoft t E9 Et + El0 Xcoft-1 
where: 
- Xcofv: Export of coffee in current Birr ; 
- Xcof : Export of coffee in constant Bin ; 
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-- 1 : Lagged variable ; 
- Xworld : World trade (from the export side) in current US$ ; 
- Pcof : The coffee price (all coffee-New York : US$ cents per pound) ; 
-E : The exchange rate : Birr per US$ ; 
-P : the GDP deflator (1980 as base year). 
These specifications permit either to test for m behaviour or demand one(T). In the case of 
the former, one accounts either for the m in domestic currency the supplier would receive 
for its produce (Pcof*E) or compared to domestic suppliers (PcoUp ; E), at given export price 
in foreign currency (the coffee price as negotiated under the International Coffee 
Organization). This leads to an equation in current price at the opposite of the demand one. 
The expected elasticity with respect to the commodity price has to be positive as that to the 
exchange rate. The world trade variable is a proxy for the world trade income or the 
purchasing power of countries consuming Ethiopian coffee. The price elasticity in the demand 
equation has to be negative. It indicates how importing countries react to the coffee price in 
foreign currency (USS). One should normally have made a difference between exports of 
coffee from the supply side and the’hemand one. Or put it another way, one.should have used 
potential exports of coffee in the supply equations compared to effective exports of coffee in 
the demand ones. We have used the same concept but at different prices for the International 
Coffee Organization tries to define quota so as to adjust supply to demand. So, we apply a 
very simple rule of thumb according to which the quota was the equilibrium within each 
producing country. 
B- Hides and Skins : 
Xhisvt = Constant + El1 Xworldt + El2 Phist + El3 Xhisvt-1 
Xhisvt = El4 Xworldt + El5 (This&t) + E16Xhisvt-1 
where: 
- Xhisv : Exports of hides and skins in current Bin ; 
- Phis : The hides price (United States - Chicago : US$ cents per pound). 
Here, the specified logic is only that of supply because in the case of hides and skins 
producers attempt to create a market and not to fulfil1 a demand already revealed. In this 
framework effective exports have been assimilated to the potential ones. 
(7) The demand equation is rather analogous to the reference model. 
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C- Rest of merchandise exports (oilseeds & pulses ; fruits, vegetables & spices ; flowers 
olioresin ; sugar & molasses ; tchat ; gum ; cotton textiles ; mining & quarrying * , 
miscellaneous) 
Xrmvt = El6 Xrmvt-1 + El7 Xcofvt + E18 Xworldt t El9 Et 
where Xrmv represents the rest of merchandise xports in current Birr. 
The specified equation accounts for an income effect through the world trade variable, an 
exchange rate one and a substitution one via the export of coffee. The focus is on supply 
behaviour so that the explained variable is in curicnt Bin. 
D- Services : 
Xsvt = E2OXworldt t Etl(Pcoftlpt) t E22(Phist/pt) t E23Et t E24Xsvt-1 
Xsvt = E25Xworldt t E26Xcofvt ‘I. ..* 
where Xsv represents the export of services in current Birr. 
Here the logic is also to account for some subsitution effects between major export 
commodities and the export of services. The focus remains on the supply behaviour so that the 
explained variable remains in current Birr. 
19. The results for coffee are shown at tables 5 and 6. Before commenting these results let us 
just briefly mention some information on the coffee market which help to analyze them. 
Ethiopian coffee is exported under the International Coffee Organization (I.C.O.) in operation 
since 1962. The I.C.O. covers nearly all producing countries. It covers all imports ones at the 
exception of the late Eastern countries and North Africa. It allocates annually maximum 
amount to be exported or quota to each member country according to the levels of the coffee 
prices and the coffee inventories. The I.C.O. rules trade for two sorts of coffee of which the 
market evolution is not the same. Arabica co&e gets a w’ * . market at about 2 
per cent a year on average since 1970. It accounts for 75 per cent’& world production (5.6 
million of tons in 1989/90 of which 4.5 are exported). Ethiopia is producing that sort of 
coffee. On trend, the country’s world share is of 4 per cent for all grades of coffee and 14 per 
cent for unwashed arabica. It does not fulfil1 its quota on trend. Robusta coffee gets a 
deDresslog; since the 70s due to a modification of the consumers’ tastes in favour of 
Arabica (which has more taste and less caffeine than Robusta), unclear African policy related 
to coffee in the 1970s and increased competition from Asian countries, for instance Indonesia. 
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The I.C.O. is a way to adjust supply to demand by voluntarily export restraints or quota 
reductions to account for price movements, mainly. These movements are revealed by the 
Coffee, sugar and cocoa exchange of New-York (only for Arabica coffees) and the Coffee 
terminal market of London (Robusta coffee). The I.C.O. was renewed in 1973 and 1986 
although since 1980 Brazil (which dominated the market since 1830 although with a 
decreased share) has been implicitly opposed to any reduction of its quota given its indebtness 
position. The I.C.O. has been explicitly blocked since July 1989 up to April 92 by Brazil. In 
1991, Brazil and Columbia have proposed a reduction of their quota of 10 per cent to stop the 
coffee price decrease since 1978. This has led the E.C.O. to come back on its Quota decreases 
propositions at its London meeting (April 92) arguing that otherwise price would continue to 
go down. They havt been divided by four since 1988. The price decrease since the 1970s is 
due to an upswing of supply compared to demand. Supply increased because past coffee 
prices were high relatively to other raw materials. Differences of evolution between supply 
(strong increase) and demand (a two per cent increase per year) created price decreases and 
inventories increases. Producing countries have attempted to export beyond their LC.O.‘s 
quota due to the impacts of price decreases on their development. At:. the end of the eighties, ‘I. II, 
the market non regulated by the LC.0. accounted for 15 per cent of the I.C.O.‘s market. 
20. The supply equations (table 5) for coffee exports illuminate nicely the evolution of the 
international coffee market previously introduced. 
. . (i) _Qn on the w of coffee. 
. rers can receive. The quota system is in operation. Domestic coffee supply fulfills the 
. . Ethiopian quota at given coffee price in domestic currency. -short rumcrty t~ 
. . puce IS ~ 0.5, its the ux&&zel (it takes 3 to 4 years to 
get coffee after planting). There is none appreciable difference between the price elasticity of 
coffee in current or constant Birr. The effect of the exchange rate cannot be disentangled from 
that of the dollar. There is a global single price elasticity. 
(ii) Compared to 1961-74, marLLe24zSe reveals an increased mtivity to pri= either 
in Birr or in purchased dollar value (the coffee price in US$ deflated by the GDP price index) 
(elasticity of about 0.7). The exchange rate being unchanged since February 1973 acts as a 
negative constant. Some speculation on this result could lead to say that on this period, private 
exporters i.e smallholders peasants (who operate 98 per cent of the -coffee production) were 
strongly expecting to receive more Bin for their produce. This could be either a way to 
require from the government a modification of the price really paid to the peasants (at 
unchanged exchange rate) or really an expectation of a change of the Bin parity (at unchanged 
paid price) or both. Given the rather low ratio of the price paid to the peasants on the world 
one (about 40 per cent on average) it is likely to say that the negative impact of the Birr parity 
on the coffee export was more a way to claim against the Ethiopian regulated coffee price than 
,- 
EXPORTS OF COFFEE 
‘.‘. 
TABLE 5. RELEVANT SUPPLY ELASTICITIES AND PARAMETER (P) 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 196189 C) 1961-74 197MQ 
SHORT RUN LONG RUN SHORT RUN ; LONG RUN 
CONSTANT P) -163.50 (6.3%) 
EXPORT(-1) 0.52 (4.1%) - 0.51 (1.1%) - 
WORLD TRADE INCOME 0.39 (0.0%) 0.62 (0.0%) 0.91 (0.0%) 
COFFEE PRICE IN BIRR 0.60 (0.0%) 0.47 (6.3%) 1 .oo 0.73 (0.0%) 
COFFEE PRICE IN BIRR ON P 0.49 (1.6%) 1.00 
COFFEE PRICE IN US$ ON P 0.62 (0.1%) 
EXCHANGE RATE -0.43 (11.3%) 
. . 
IQ WI) 
D-W 
D-H 
Multicolllnearfty between: 
0.98 
1.57 
explanalory varlabfes (4) 
0.98 
1.34 
0.60 
explanatory variables (4) 
0.95’ 
1.41 
0.43 
explanatory Larfables (~0) 
0.61 0.97 
2.15 1.80 
world bade 8 const (4) woridtrade&e(<O) 
coffee price & const (4) coffee pice & e (4) 
: NOTE 
(‘) 1961-89 and not 1960-90 as previously indicated since data for the coffee commodity price were missing. 
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a way to speculate against the Birr parity. Indeed, the peasants had to sell their coffee to the 
Coffee Marketing Board at pre-determined selling price. Further, they were strongly 
discriminated in favour of state farms and producers co-operatives for credit and input 
services. There was also a purchasing price gap favourable to state farms and co-operatives. 
Whatever were the explanation of the exchange rate variable, it had a negative impact on the 
coffee export supply on 1974-89. This is testified by the relevant negative constant term 
substituted for the exchange rate in another equation for 1974-89. Here likely the impact of 
drought is also accounted. 
(iii) On this period (1974-89) also a world uect amrs . . with an e-v of about 0.6 
to 0.8 which seems normal in the light of other studies on the coffee market Bond (1983) for 
Kenya, for instance. On 1974-89, it is relevant to get an impact from ‘he world trade or 
international proxied purchasing power. Indeed, the coffee market has entered into crisis, 
demand is still growing up but at a reduced growth rate. At the opposite, competition has 
increased between producing countries which have planted very much (too much) because the 
coffee prices were relatively high compared to other raw materials. By 1978, prices decrease 
on trend and producers have to accept increased reduction of their quota although some of 
them exported on the,non I.C.O.‘s ma&et. 
(iv) atlnngryn, (1961 
. . . - 89).wome elastu%y of coffee exports F w - 
Q,$ but consistent with other long term studies. For instance, B. Daviron and F. L.esin got a 
. . . . . value of 0.5 computed on the period 1883-1985(S). 3. The 
value belongs to the interval of elasticities for the international coffee market indicated by the 
World Bank in an unpublished document (values from 0.12 to 0.72). As for other periods the 
impact of the exchange rate cannot be disentangled from that of the coffee price in dollar. 
21. The demand equations for coffee (table 6) indicate that : 
(i) on’1960-74 the import countries were only sensitive to the exchange rate (elasticity going 
from iO.5 to 1.0). This is fully consistent with the I.C.O.. Indeed, importing country fully 
agreed to buy the producing countries’ quota at negotiated US$ price. Lower price in foreign 
currency led to increased quota ; 
(ii) on 1974-90, the foreign currency effect reduces (elasticity from 1.0 to 0.61) and a world 
trade (income) one appears (elasticity at about 0.4) because demand is growing more slowly 
than production ; ,, -‘ 
(iii) at long run (1961-89), some saturation of demand appears, importing countries react 
then also to coffee price in foreign currency with a low but relevant elasticity (-0.13); the 
(8) “Le cafk”, LX Economica, Co11 Cyclope, 1990. 
EXPORTS OF COFFEE 
TABLE 6. RELEVANT DEMAND ELASTICITIES 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 196189 1961-74 1974-M 
SHORT RUN LONG RUN SHORT RUN LONG RUN 
EXPORT(-1) 0.37 
g.y;; 
- 0.49 (1.9%) - 
WORLD TRADE INCOME 0.14 
(14.; %\ 
0.22 0.39 (0.1%) 
COFFEE PRICE IN US$ -0.06 -0.13 
- - EXCHANGE RATE 0.57 (0.0%) 0.90 0.52 (1.6%) 1.00 0.61 (0.0%) 
R2 WI) 
D-W 
D-H ‘. 
MultIcollinearity b&w&: 
0.96 
2.12 
expolt(-1) & expe rate (<o) 
coffee price d workd trade (4) 
0.99 0.96 
2.21 1.50 
-1.20 . . . 
explanatory vatiables (SO) explanatory variables (<O) 
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world income effect again reduces : elasticity from 0.39 on 1974-89 to 0.22 which is not very 
far from the supply one to world income ; 
(iv) the long run world income elasticity is considerably lower than that from the reference 
model (1.12). 
22. The’results for hides and skins are shown at table 7. Comments are as follows : 
. (i) The last three specified equations indicate : 
l- a scitv of about 0.7 with a world. , 
2- a world trade elasticity slightly increasing through time at the opposite of the supply price 
one ; 
3- a dollar supply price elasticity and not a Birr one ; further, on periods 61-74 and 61-89 it 
is an elasticity to the dollar purchased values (ie the price in dollar deflated by the GDP price 
index) which matters ; 
4- no exchange rate effect. 
(ii) The first specified equation (which is also the one we would select) shows a constant 
negative influence relevant only on period 1961-89. It renders insignificant the world trade 
variable at the oppo@e for the laggedexplained variable and increases drastically the effects 
of the commodity price (in US dollar). Since the lagged variable reveals a push effect. rather 
analogous to the world trade one, it could have been implicitly substituted for world trade in 
the specified equation. The high elasticity with respect to price (1.66) is fully consistent with 
WB’s analysis showing that for the moment hides and skins is the lonely sector which can be 
run profitably in Ethiopia. That is also the lonely one for which future perspectives are 
relatively positive. 
(iii) The opposite changes of supply price and world trade elasticities as the level of these 
elasticities since the first period of analysis and the dollar price elasticity might be explained 
as follows :‘the marketing and pricing of hides and skins has undergone a rapid change over a 
short period of time. Until1 1984, the market operated in a condition of intense competition 
between private exporters and parastatals such as the Leather and Shoe Corporation (LX) 
and the Hides and Skins Marketing Corporation (HSMC). Since prices were influenced by the 
international market (the Us and Australian ones) (dollar supply price, elasticity), the LSC was 
unable to compete effectively with private exporters (price elasticity was higher than world 
trade one, that is the purchased value of dollar which matters). Iii’ 1984, the government 
sought to alleviate this problem by assigning the responsibility of exporting raw hides and 
skins to HSMC, and revoked the export licences of private traders (price elasticity decreases, 
the dollar supply price elasticity matters). However the government’s attempt to shore up these 
parastatals failed, and the HSMC was dissolved in 1989. The export of raw hides and skins 
was banned as a rule (a negative constant influence is operating) and the LSC was given the 
monopoly of purchasing domestic hides and skins, processing them and supplying both the 
EXPORTS OF HIDES AND SKINS 
TABLE 7. RELEVANT SUPPLY ELASTICITIES AND PARAMETER (P) 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 1961-69 1961-74 1974-89 
SHORT RUN LONQ RUN 
f 
CONSTANT P) -21.48 (0.0%) - 
EXPORT(-1) 0.50 (0.0%) - 0.33 (0.1%) 
WORLD TRADE 0.20 (0.6%) 0.29 (13.1%) 
HIDES & SKINS PRICE IN US$ 0.83 (0.0%) 1.66 0.72 (0.1%) 
HIDES b SKINS PRICE IN US$ ON P 0.69 (0.0%) 0.80 (0.0%) 
R2 WI) 
DW 
D-H ‘. 
MulUcolllneartty between: ‘. 
0.94 
1.83 
0.38 
price in US$ & constant (4) 
price in USS 8 export(-1) (~0) 
0.98 
1.59 (CO) 
exphatory variables (-$v. 
0.99 
1.96 
price in US$ & wodd bde (<o) 
0.98 
1.66 (CO) 
price in US$ (L wodd trade (4) 
30 
domestic and external markets (world trade elasticity increases). Along with this institutional 
rearrangement, the domestic pricing and marketing mechanisms were also revised. Prices 
began to be institutionally determined by a committee composed of members from the 
ministries of agriculture, industry and foreign trade 1)11 the basis m-ices (short 
and long run price elasticity to be accounted for). 
23. The results for the r& of the merchandise package are shown at table 8. They reveal : 
(i) very high elasticities to world trade and the exchange rate. While the first one is strongly 
influenced by 1960-74, the second one is the result of 1974-90. Since on that period the 
exchange rate is unchanged, it plays the role of a constant : a positive one contrarily to the 
exports of coffee ; 
(ii) a strong substitution effect between coffee export and the rest of merchandise export, 
particularly during 1974-90 (elasticity above -1). This is likely due to the quota system 
imposed by the DERG-regime. Under this one, peasants were assigned to deliver a fixed 
amount of production to the Coffee Marketing Corporation (AMC) whatever the producers’ 
situation were, at pre-determined purchasing price. In case of a too Jaw level of production 
the peasants were required to do theirduty by purchasing from the open market. Since there 
was some positive difference between the open market and AMC prices, they incured.losses 
in that case. So, the coffee exports institutional arrangement was designing the profitability of 
the peasants’ activities before any other commodity on 1974-90. 
24. The results for the exports of services are shown at table 9. They indicate : 
(i) a world trade supply elasticity above one at long run (1960-90) with very relevant 
substitution (or rentability) effect coming from the prices for coffee and hides & skins exports 
(price elasticities of about -0.3 and -0.5). 
(ii) The coffee price substitution effect is carried on by the 1974-90 period. On this period, 
the substitution effect operates through tie coffee quota system and not the coffee price. 
(iii) As for the rest of merchandise export there is a positive exchange rate effect which 
increases at long run (elasticity from about 0.2 to 0.6). The exchange rate effect is not relevant 
on 1974-90. 
25. Now let us just summarize some selected long-run results we git‘through the estimation 
of export functions : 
l- Ethiopian coffee ~JJQ& gets a low world income elasticity (about 0.4), their price (Sir-r) 
elasticity is higher (0.6). 
2- Ethiopian coffee demand gets a low price (dollar) elasticity (about -0.1) and a low world 
income one (about 0.2) with a high elasticity to the exchange rate (0.9). 
REST OF MERCHANDISE EXPORTS 
TABLE 8. RELEVANT SUPPLY ELASTICITIES 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 1961-69 1961-74 1974-69 
SHORT RUN LONG RUN ‘SHORT RUN LONG RUN 
REST OF MERCHANDISE EXPORT(-1) 0.37 - 0.89 - WORLD TRADE (2.9%) 0.50 
EXPORTS OF COFFEE (1.7%) 
(0.5%) 
0.79 0.55 -0.46 (0.2%) 1.77 0.40 
-0.74 
(10.5%) 
-0.23 
!iXCHANQE RATE 
(1.6%) (1.3%) -0.74 -1.10 0.57 (4.5%) 0.90 (0.1%) 
1.69 (0.0%) 
- 
~$4’ 
D-H 
MullicoRinearity between: 
‘. 
0.94 
1.54 (C.0) 
1.45 
world lrade & Ixqm-ts of coffee (4) 
0.99 
1.79 
0.66 
rest of me&. export (-1) 8 world trade (40) 
rest of me&. expri(-1) & exports of coffee (Co) 
. . 
0.94 
1.57 
mpods of coffee 81 world trade (CO) 
.- 
EXPORTS OF SERVICES 
TABLE 9. RELEVANT SUPPLY ELASTICITIES 
D(PLANATORY VARIABLES ’ -’ - 1900-90 1960-74 1974-90 
SHORT RUN LONQ RUN SHORT RUN LONG RUN 
EXPORTS OF SERVICES(-1) 
WORLD TRADE 
COFFEE PRICE IN US$ ON P 
HIDES 6. SKINS PRICE IN US$ ON P 
EXCHANGE RATE 
0.24 (10.5%) - 0.33 (4.2%) - 
0.68 (0.0%) 1.13 0.50 (0.1%) 0.75 1.25 (0.0%) 
-0.21 (x3%) -0.28 -0.26 (0.8%) 
-0.35 (10.8%) -0.46 
0.47 (0.2%) 0.62 0.17 (20.9%) 
cupoltI or mffm 
0.25 
132 WI) 
D-W 
D-H 
Mulfiioilineadty between: 
‘. 
0.96 
1.77 
0.97 
eapods of services(-i) & world trade (4) 
exchange rate & world trade (~0) 
hides and skims price 8. world trade (~0) 
hkles and skins pffce & exchange rate (4) 
0.95 
2.03 
-0.34 
exports of SWViCeS(-1) h world trade (CO) 
exports of services{-1) d excharge rate (CO) 
. . 
0.95 
1.34 
explanatory vatiabfes (4) 
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3- Hides and Skins get a world income elasticity of about 0.3 and a dollar price one of 
about 0.7. 
4- For the two main export commodities (i.e coffee and hides and skins) the focus of 
suppliers is more on the prices they are really paid for than on some expected ones resulting 
from some hypothetical change to the Birr parity. This is because the State has extracted their 
income surplus through pre-determined purchasing prices and has no other choice but to 
continue this policy even if it combined with market liberalization and incentives to the 
peasantry. 
5- Other merchandise exports get an high world income elasticity (of about 0.8) and 
exchange rate one (0.9). Forced coffee exports has restrained these exports with an elasticity 
of about -0.7. 
6- Services exports get the highest world income elasticity (greater than one) with an 
exchange rate one of about 0.6. They are very influenced by the domestic purchased value of 
the dollar exports of coffee (elasticity of about -0.3) and that of Hides and Skins (elasticity of 
about -0.5). Their exchange rate elasticity is 0.6. 
7- Generally, the export exchange rate elasticities are high (from 0.6 to 0.9). This is an 
indication of very elastic demand or&,&ply curves. 
8- These results lead to the following & figures were price and exchange rate 
elasticities have been assimilated. 
Range values for elasticities 
World income 
<0.5 --> Coffee, hides & skins 
>0.5 --> Other merchandise exports 
>l.O --> Services 
Price (Birr or SW) ; hides & skins, 
>:0.5; Other merchandise exports, 
Exchange rate 
9- Compared to the reference framework (IMF) the main difference concerns the world 
income elasticity. Ethiopian exports (ie coffee) have a lower world income elasticity (0.22 
compared to 1.12). ,I -1. 
lo- In case of a modification of the Birr parity to the US$ the main teaching is that the 
following scenario could very well be relevant : no real increase coming from the supply side 
without price liberalization leading to strong price increases in Birr pilid to the suppliers. Thus 
at modified Birr (and high foreign demand elasticity to the exchange rate), all would depend 
on the nominal and effective protection ratios (i-e that which includes also the input 
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protection). The protection policy may circumvent any expected supply responses to the Birr 
parity adjustment. 
IMPORTS: 
A- Merchandise : 
26. The import relations cover merchandise and services respectively. The merchandise 
relations were specified as follows: 
(A) LOt = Const + #lL(M/Y)t-1 + @I&m) t + @L(C/p)t + +WFWMv)t + #SL(p)t 
(Abis) L(M)t = Constant + #6L(Y/p)t + #7L(pm)t + #3L@WMv)t 
(B) Lot = #9L(M)t-1+ @OLWp)t + #llL(p)t + #12L@WMv)t 
where : 
-L : Log form I,; 
.<. .a, 
-- 1 : Lagged variable ; 
- M .: : Total of merchandise import (c.i.f) in constant Birr (1980 as base year) ; 
-C : Private consumption in current Birr; 
- Y/p : GDP in constant Bin ; 
- Rv : Reserves in current Birr ; 
-Mv : Total of merchandise import (c.i.f) in current Birr ; 
- PC : Private consumption deflator ; 
-Pm : Import price (1980 as base year) in domestic currency (Birr) ; 
-P : GDP deflator (1980 as base year) : 
. These specifications are very conventional. They permit to capture the development constraw 
either via the import to GDP ratio lagged’ one year or the real income (GDP) alone, or the 
lagged explained variable alone ; some mtion-comp&ion effect either via the import 
. . and domestic production deflators or the real exchange rate ; some Izh;rsical competrtlnn effect 
via the lagged production variable (GDP) embodied in the lagged import ratio, m 
food production via private consumption and & restricted fore&n exchange avail&&y via 
the reserves to imports ratio. So, the specifications are more sophisticated than the reference 
model which analyses imports only in terms of GDP, the real exchange rate, the reserves ratio 
and the lagged explained variable (model B). 
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27. The results for merchandise are given at tables 10 and 11. The first set of equations (model 
A at table 10) indicates that as time has been running : 
(i) the deveioDment conQr& (income elasticity of 1.49 on 1960-74) has given rise since 
mid-1970s to an inertia effect via the explained variable lagged one year (with an elasticity of 
. . about 0.2); a ecal sub- effect via the real production variable lagged one 
year (with an elasticity of -0.2 to -0.3) and a high food depd effect via the private 
consumption variable (with an elasticity going from 0.4 to 1.0) ; 
(ii) the CQIIQ&W constraint reveals a weak price elasticity of demand (and to the exchange 
rate) (from -0.2 to -0.3) slightly decreasing on 1974-90, contrarily to a rather strong 
elasticity to domestic price (long run elasticity of between 0.7 to 0.8) which appears on 1974- 
90 (this later surprising result is likely due to the multicollinearity between import and 
domestic prices) ; 
(iii) the foreign exchange constraint reveals a weak decreasing elasticity (from 0.03 to 0.01). 
Ail this is fully consistent with what is known about Ethiopia. For instance, the country has 
faced (and is still facing) a deep agricultural crisis under which food production per capita 
drastically decreased (paragraph 1). As a result, the country has imported more and more to 
feed the population,: Political and”‘e&nomical choices favouring industry while neglecting 
domestic resources and inter-sectoral linkages plus war against Somalia (by 1977) and civil 
war increased continuously imports (military ones) whatever their prices were at the cost of 
decreased reserves. 
(iv) Ethiopia has become heavily dependent on imports. 
The second set of equations (model B at table 11) delivers the same conclusions :
(i) a, high import content of growth (elasticity of 1.25)(9), a weak and decreasing foreign 
exchange constraint (0.02) but at short run only (it increases but slightly .at long-run : 0.04), a 
weak and constant real exchange rate elasticity (-0.27) legding to a weak and constant 
elasticity to domestic prices (0.27). This latter as its evolution seems much more plausible 
given Ethiopian reality of continuous imports because of wrong or misguided policy, war and 
agriculture shortage. So, model B should be selected for further analysis. 
(ii) Compared to the reference framework, Ethiopian imports are more elastic to GDP (1.25 
compared to 0.97) , and less elastic to the real exchange rate (-0.27 compared to -0.95) and 
the reserves ratio (0.04 compared to 0.23). These comparative resliits are a reflection of a 
smaller inertia effect (elasticity of 0.48 compared to 0.834) and a greater short run 
development constraint (elasticity of 0.65 compared to 0.161), the short run reserves 
constraint being rather analogous (0.02 compared to 0.038). 
(9) In that sort of equations, the income elasticity can be viewed as a weighted average of these of private 
consumption, lagged income and import featuring model A. 
.- 
IMPORTS OF MERCHANDISE 
TABLE 10. MODEL A : RELEVANT ELASTtCITIES AND PARAMETER (P) 
EXPANATORY VARIABLES 1960-90 1960-74 1974-90 
SHORT RUN LONG RUN SHORT RUN LONG RUN 
CONSTANT (P) 
GDP 
w-0 
RATIO(-l) I divided by 
WP(-I) 
IMPORT PRICE IN BIRR 
GDP DEFLATOR 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION 
RATIO : RESERVES ON IMPORTS 
IN CURRENT BIRR 
-270 (0.8%) - -1.92 (8.8%) 
1.49 (0.0%) 
020 aI9 
0.20 (0.2%) - 0.19 (3.9%) : 
420 425 OJ9 -02 
-0.20 (1 .S%) -0.25 -0.25 (8.9%) -0.15 (15.8%) -0.19 
0.56 (2.9%) 0.70 0.63 (5.4%) 0.78 
0.80 (0.2%) 1.00 0.31 (14.0%) 0.38 
0.01 (22%) 0.01 0.03 (10.0%) 0.02 (2.4%) 0.02 
‘. 
- 
I72 wi) 
D-W 
Muiticollinearity behveen: 
0.94 
2.09 
resewes EL gdp deflator (k-0) 
axw3tanl CL private consumption (CO) 
impori(-l)/QDP(-1) d import price (~0) 
gdp deflator & import price (4) 
gdp deflator a private consumption (x0) 
0.92 
1.h 
gdp & constant (4) 
reserves,& import price (4) 
1.00 
2.24 
resewes L p&ate consumption (~0) 
gdp detlator d @vale cwwumption (4) 
gdp deflator I reserves (20) 
impxt(-l)/gdp(-1) L gclp deflator (4) 
gdp deflator a inporl price (<o) 
IMPORTS OF MERCHANDISE 
TABLE il. MODEL B : RELEVANT ELASTICITIES 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 1960-90 1960-74 
SHORT RUN LONG&N 
IMPORTS{-1) 
GDP 
IMPORT PRICE 
REAL EXCH. RATE = 6-9 
GDP DEFdWVR 
RATIO : RESERVES ON IMPORTS 
IN CURRENT BIRR 
0.48 
0.65 I:::7 - 00 1.25 1.23 (0.0%) 
0.14 627 0.26 
-0.14 (3.6%) U.27 -0.26 (4.6%) 
0.14 0.27 0.26 
0.02 (0.1%) 0.04 0.03 (1.8%) 
~2 WI 1.00 
D.-W 1.84 . . 2: (CO) 
D-H , 
Multicollinear& between: 
0.69 
r real exchange rate & gdp (4) reserves 8 gdp (>0) 
irrports (-1) & gdp (~0). real exch. rate & gdp (4) 
irnports(-1) & real exchange rate (~0) 
irnpoks(-1) (L reserves (4) 
gdp 8 reserves (<o) 
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B- Services : 
28. The services relation was specified as follows: 
L(Ms)t = #13L(Ms)t-l + #14L(Y/p)t + @lSL(Rv/Mv)t 
where Ms are the imports of services in constant Birr. 
It accounts simply for the imports needed to develop the economy via the GDP variable and 
the lagged explained one and the financial resources constraint via the reserves ratio. The 
results given at table 12 indicate the following : 
(i) at long run the elasticity to real production which is of about one tends slightly to 
decrease (0.9). Compared to merchandise imports equations with an analogous structure the 
development elasticity is slightly lower (about one compared to 1.25) but with the same 
evolution ; 
(ii) there is a long-run elasticity to foreign exchange availability of about 0.09 i.e above the 
merchandise related to one. Further, it slightly increases. This is due to merchandise which 
receive priority in terms of reserves’re’quirement, at the opposite of services. 
29. The selected results of the import analysis (model B for merchandise) can be synthetised 
as follows : 
(i) At long run, merchandise imports depend strongly on development (elasticity above l), 
their price elasticity is low as their real exchange rate one (about -0.3) ; the elasticity of 
substitution between home produced and import goods is also low (about 0.3) ; the reserves 
constraint has the lower elasticity (0.04) in absoltute values. 
(ii) Services imports have also a high development elasticity (about 0.9) although lower than 
for merchandise ; no detectable effect from either import price or domestic ones is noted ; the 
reserves constraint is low (elasticity of 0.09) although quite higher (more than doubled) than 
for merchandise. 
(iii) In the eventuality of a Bin devaluatianjmport would not verymuch reduce because of 
. . ected prrce mcrease. Thus leads to conclude thatthere could verv well be a J curve 
. . . . effecther deterrnratton of the balance of tradetis case. 
BIRR PARITY OUlZlX2N. . 
30. The analysis made on exports and imports permits us to clarify a little bit the question of 
the modification of the exchange rate. For this, let us just focus on some conditions which 
could help to speculate on the macro impacts of the expected (by the World Bank) 
IMPORTS OF SERVICES 
TABLE 12. RELEVANT ELASTICITIES 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 1960-90 _ 1960-74 1974-m 
SHORT RUN LONG RUN SHORl;RUN LONG RUN 
IMPORTS OF SERVICES(-1) 0.45 (0.0%) - 0.44 (0.096) - 
QDP 0.50 (0.0%) 0.09 0.56 (O.o%.) 1.00 
RATIO : RESERVES ON IMPORTS 0.05 (2.7%) 0.09 
IN CURRENT BIRR 
~2 (A4 0.99 
D-W 1.96 
D-H 0.11 (CO) 
Multlcolllnearity between: Imports of servfces(-1) & ~dp (-3) 
‘. imports of sevlces(-1) 8 reserves (~0) 
0.99 
2.54 
-1.48 
explanatory variables (4) 
0.99 
2.28 
explanatory var. (20) 
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modification of the Birr parity, being obviously aware that a devaluation is much more 
complex than the dynamics of a set of equations. Accompanying policies matter, indeed, as 
much as some mathematical conditions or maybe more. And furthermore, political and social 
climates are also key determinants. Parameters used to quantify the conditions are those of 
coffee in the case of export and merchandise in that of imports. 
(i) The simplest Marshall-Lemer condition to get an improvement to the balance of trade in 
foreien currency is : 
QTCVot 6 > TCVo 
where : 
-5) : foreign demand elasticity to Ethiopian export commodity (absolute value : 0.13) ; 
- TCVo : ratio of export to import, both aggregates in current domestic currency (53.1 in 
1990) ; 
-6 : domestic demand elasticity to the import price (absolute value : 0.20). 
The result is 
0.27 = [(0.13*0.531)+0.20] < 0.531 
. . 
So, thebalance currency would deteriorcatc; in case of a de v- of the 
(ii) The simplest condition to get an improvment to the balance of trade in &me& currency 
is ! 
QTCVot6 >l 
The result is : 
0.27 = [(0.13*0.531)+0.20] < 1 
So, the balance of trade in Birr would also deteriorate. 
(iii) Extended condition to get an improvment to the trade balance is 
PX x (dx+l ) (sm+l) 
Etb= --k-* > 0 
PM M (dx/sx -1) (sm/dm - 1) 
where : 
- Etb : trade balance elasticity to the exchange rate ; 
PX * x 
: TCVo (0.531 in 1990) ; 
PM * M ,, .' 
- dx, dm : price elasticity of export and import demand (0.13 ; 0.20) ; 
- sx, sm : price elasticity of supply export and import (0.60 : coffee ; 0.90) ; 
The result is also negative. 
(iv) A more exhaustive (but also more sophisticated) set of conditions to appreciate static 
macro effects is due to Thorvaldur Gylfasson. It gives the macro impact per one per cent 
change to the parity. It is the following : 
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$2 = ((1-e)[(l-e)r(s2ts-l)tss-&e(l-r)(l-a)]-e(1-e)} / n 
Gjih ((1-e)[(l-e)r(szts-1)te~-e(l-r)(l-a>l-e)~/1-a 
db/E^ = (1-a) Y [(Y/E)+81 
where : 
,. : change in percentage ;
- Y, Q : real income and output respectively ; 
-E : the exchange rate ; 
-8 : elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported input (0.20) ; 
- D ,6 : price elasticity of exports, imports (absolute values) (0.13 ; 0.20) ; 
-a : income elasticity of consumption (0.90) ; 
-8 : share of imported input in domestic output (to be computed) ; 
-r : share of final goods imports in national income (0.65) ; 
-B : share of input in total imports (0.63) ; 
- db : variation of the balance of trade ; 
I e=prip-h(i--r)] =0.53"' *" n = i-p--~~p-r)~=0.85 
The results are a decrease of real income of 0.32 per cent, of real output of 1.80 per cent and a 
deterioration of the balance of trade of about Birr 200 million per percentage change of the 
Birr parity. So, again it appears that the Bin parity question needs a lot of investigations 
particularly from the viewpoint of accompanying policies before being decided. 
II-4)LABOURPRODUCTI?TI'Y: 
31. Contrarily to the reference framework the relationship has not been specified as a Cobb- 
Douglas production function but as a transcendental one which is an extension to the Cobb 
Douglas case. The transcendental function has the form : 
It has the characteristic of allowing marginal products to rise before eventually falling. This 
has seemed us more relevant in the case of Ethiopia where agriculture is the dominant activity 
and where the soil degradation reduces potential land yields by 1 to 2 per cent per year on 
average. At the purpose to get something relevant for a market-based economy, we estimated 
the V function under the form of a labour productivity relationship. 
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In log form this leads to : 
hi!@/PL)t = Cobant + @lbg(L)t + 82Lt + 83Log(K)t + 84Kt 
where : 
- Y/pL: Labour productivity i.e GDP in real terms divided by total labour force ; 
-L : The labour force ; 
-K : The capital stock computed using the perpetual inventory modeI( 
Available data (the investment ones in real terms) only permitted to estimate the relation on 
the period 1968-88. 
32. Results are shown at table 13. They indicate : 
(i) diminishing returns to capital intensity i.e capital per head. As one keeps raising the 
amount of capital per head, labour becomes more productive and therefore output rises. 
However, the increase in output becomes progressively less. Additional capital cooperating 
with a given labour f&e is invariably’productive but at a diminishing rate. The elasticity to 
the capital stock is very high (13.4) as that to the labour force (-3.6). This seems a little odd 
although 
a) we have to account for the influences of the exponential terms of the transcendental 
function (capital elasticity of -1.3 ; labour elasticity of 1.1) and 
b) we were not able to find other studies with the same function to appreciate wether 
our results were convergent or not. The constant term also seems odd although it has to 
account for the differences of unity between the explanatory variables. 
(ii) that although some of the results appear interesting there are biased for there is strong 
multicollinearity between explanatory variables as it is generally the case with production 
functions. Due to a time constraint we were not able to correct the function for the mentioned 
problem. Nevertheless, we have thought to a solution. It would have been to run a factor 
analysis on the explanatory variables. Then, using their principal components in the regresston 
analysis would have deleted the multicollinearity. 
(10) To apply the perpetual inventory model, one needs estimations ofa depreciation rate and a departing 
capital coefficient. A rather simple method is to regress GDP as a function of GDP(-1) and investment : I or I(- 
I). The GDP(-I) parameter is a rough estimation of one minus the depreciation rate while that of investment 
gives one divided by the capital coefficient. This method suffers from a lot of economic and econometric 
imperfections. Nevertheless, it leads to plausible results. For more detailed analysis, the reader should refer to 
“The determination of a capital stock serie for developing countries : some comments to be sure what one gets is 
a real cheashire cat and not its grid” by N. Troubat (OECD) and M.P. Verlaeten (DIAL), July 1992. 
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n 
(1) v = a0 + C aizi + E (multicollinearity between the zi) 
i-l 
(2) Z* = FA (F : principal component factor; 
Z* : standardized zi; 
A : loading factor matrix) 
n 
(3) v = CO + C ciFi + E 
i=l 
(It is without multicollinearity since Fi’ are 
are independent from each other i.e the 
covariance between any two of them is zero) 
33. We also estimated an equation where a Pascal distribution was introduced to test for the 
capital coefficient. Let us recall briefly that such a distribution gives the lagged effects of 
some explanatory variables through a r stage process. When the r stages involve the same lag, 
the process lag distribution is : 
. I .  ,.a 
2: 
(1--c)r 
l-m> = 
(l-t8)r 
where : 
-r : number of stages ; 
-8 : lag operator ; 
-7 : lag parameter. 
For instance, with r=2 and one explanatory variable the following model 
(l-t)2 
yt = P xt 
(1-r8)2 
reduces to 
However, one problem in using this lag form is that it involves estinia~ing an equation subject 
to nonlinear constraints. Jorgenson’s approach was to generalise this form such that the roots 
of the lag polynomial need not to be equal. So, one gets : 
Yt = jwrl)(l-72)xt + (71+72)Yt-l- 7172Yt-2 
to be estimated. 
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LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
TABLE 13. TRANSCENDENTAL PRODUCTION FUNCTION : 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 196&66 
CONSTANT (P) 
Log(LASOUR FORCE) 
LABOUR FORCE 
Log(CAPKAL STOCK) 
CAPITAL STOCK 
-53.00 (O.%) 
-3.56 (O.%) 
1.14 (0.7%) 
13.37 P.=J 
-1.25 (6.4%) 
IQ (W) 0.93 
D-W 1.63 
Multlcolllnearfty between : ‘. explanatory variables 
TABLE 14. PASCAL DISTRIBUTION : 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 196688 
BHORT RUN LONO RUN 
LoQ(lABoUR moDucnvm)(-1) 0.16 (17.1%) - 
Log(lmOUR PRODUGnVm)(-2) -0.22 (5.5%) - 
Log(LABOUR FORCE) -0.53 (0.0%) -0.66 
Log(CAPlTAL STOCK) 1.59 (0.0%) 2.60 
_. 
R2 WI 1.00 
D-W 1.63 
D-H 0.67 
MuMcolllnearHy between : IEbour force 6 mpltai shxh (<O) 
. . 
Labour pfoductMty(-I -2) & capital stodt (4) 
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34. The preceding has led us to estimate : 
bg(YhL)t = ssLogQt+e6Log(K)t+s7Log(Y/pL)t-l+es~g~/pL)t-2 
Results are shown at table 14. Comments are as follows : 
(i) With such a function, the major impact of the explanatory variables no more comes 
immediately followed by less and less strong impacts. The impacts come through a m m 
process, both parts of which take time. So, the lag distribution of the whole process is a 
function of the two lag distributions of the individual stages. The whole process distribution is 
the convolution of the stage processes. 
(ii) The lag process operates through the following elasticities : 
-0.53 = /31(1-tl)(l-&) --> for the labour force 
1.60 = 82(1-rl)(l-22) --> for the capital stock 
The values of rl and 22 are respectively 0.54 and -0.38 so that the long run elasticities are : 
1) - 0.86 for the labour force 
2) 2.60 for the&pita1 stock .” “’ 
These results seem more acceptable but again we lack from other studies to appreciate wether 
they are plausible or not. The reference framework shows a unitary elasticity to the capital 
coefficient of labour i.e the same elasticities but with opposite signs for both capital and the 
labour force. Compared to the IMFs framework, Ethiopian productivity is more dependent on 
capital. This seems fully consistent with the poverty level prevailing in Ethiopia compared to 
the set of countries in the IMF,s study(l). 
n-5) MONEY : 
35. The money demand equation has been specified as follows : 
(A) Mt = 61 Mt-1 + 62 (Y/p)t-2 + 63 it 
where : _, -* 
-M : real balances i.e Ml deflated by the GDP price index ; 
- Y/p : GDP in real terms ; 
-i : the treasury bill rate in % ; 
It is a demand for real balances as for the IMFs paper. Indeed, it is the purchasing power of 
money, not the number of their currency bills that matters to holders of money. The demand 
for real balances depends positively on the level of real income and negatively on the nominal 
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interest rate. This later (negative) influence explains because the cost of holding money is the 
interest that is forgone by holding it rather than interest-bearing assets. Transactions costs to 
move in and out of interest-bearing assets are an essential aspect of money demand. The 
existence of these costs makes it optimal to hold some money. The inventory-theoretic 
approach shows that an individual will hold an optimal stock of real balances departing from 
the following formula : 
b * (Y/P) ' 
M= --------- 
2*i 
where b is the cost of transacting. This formula indicates that the. oI;:!mal income elasticity of 
money is 0.5 as that to the transactions costs and that to the interest rate -0.5. When one 
accounts for an integral number of transactions it leads to a real income elasticity varying 
from 0.5 to unity and an elasticity to the interest rate going from -0.5 to zero. 
36. The demand for real balances leads easily to an LM curve when equating real balances 
demand and supply 1: 
M(s) = k*v/p) - h*i b0, h<O 
Then’solving for the interest rate (i), one gets : l 
i = F*W/p) - M(s)l/h 
which is the LM curve or the schedule of combinations of the interest rate and level of real 
income such that the money market is in equilibrium. When the money market is in 
equilibrium, so too is the bond market. The reason for which one looks at a LM curve 
departing from a demand for real balances is to permit to appreciate the capital market 
flexibility of a given country at money market equilibrium. Further details will be given 
through a specific section devoted to Ethiopian capital market flexibility (U-6). 
37. The results of real balances estimation, are shown at table 15 (model A). 
(i) They indicate just opposite signs for money demand elasticities with respect to real 
income (lagged two years) and the interest rate (about 0.3 in absolute values) at long run 
(1960-90). _a. 
(ii) There are no appreciable differences to be noticed for 1974L90 apart maybe that real 
income and interest rate elasticities are slightly below the long-run ones. The meaning of this 
change is difficult to explain for no correct estimations were obtained for 1960-74. 
(iii) Also to be noticed the too high value (greater than one) for the lagged real balances 
elasticity. 
.- 
MONEY DEMAND 
TABLE 15. RELEVANT ELASTICITIES 
EXPLANATORY VAFUABLES 1966.99 1974-90 
MODEL A MODELB i M9’JEL A MODEL B 
MONEY(-1) 1.05 (0.0%) 1.08 (0.0%) 1.07 (0.0%) 1.10 (0.0%) 
QDP(-2) 0.29 (4.6%) 0.36 (4.1%) 0.23 (129%) 0.51 (0.9%) 
NOMINAL INTEREST RATE -9.34 (1.8%) -0.29 (4.7%) 
INFLATION(+l) -0.43 (1.9%) -9.61 (0.4%) 
132 (41 
D-W 
D-H 
Multlcdlinearity between: 
1.00 
207 
-0.47 
9dp(-2) & Int.rate (<O) 
_. 
2: 
-0.73 
9dp(-2) & MatIon (e0) 
1.00 
238 
-1.01 
9dp(-2) 81 ht. rate (4) 
1.09 
1.94 (CO) 
-0.05 
gdp(-2) & Intlatlon (.dIo) 
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38. The preceding results led us to adress a set of questions; 
- I!& why to get the lagged explained variable in the equations. Economists would say 
to account for a lag. When the level of income or the interest rate changes, there is first only a 
small change in the money demand. Then, over the course of time, the change in the demand 
for money increases, slowly building up to its full long-run change. Reasons for this lag are 
not yet certain. There are two possibilities. The lags may arise because there are costs of 
adjusting money holdings or they may rise because money holders’ expectations are slow to 
adjust. If a person believes that a given change in the interest rate is temporary, she may be 
unwilling to make a major change in her money holdings. As time passes and it becomes 
clearer that the change is not transitory, she is more willing to make a larger adjustment. From 
the preceding, it appears that economic rationality can explain why to include M(-1) in the 
equation but not with an elasticity greater than one. Indeed, the adjustment process would not 
operate because the implicit differential equation would diverge. An elasticity greater than one 
can only be economically accepted though always denied mathematically when the lagged 
explained variable implicitly includes other explanatory variables positively linked to the 
demand for real balances. Such an assertion is very much relevant since there are reasons to 
believe that the transactions costs &e”so accounted for as the expectations related- to inflation. 
So, as long as not all explanatory variables have been identified in the real balances demand 
equation, probability of getting a too high elasticity for the lagged explained variable remains. 
- Second, why to get a two years lagged income variable? This could either be a pure 
multicollinearity result (between GDP and the interest rate) or that of very slow changes to the 
interest rate in response to the real income ones so as to maintain money equilibrium (by 
definition of the LM curve). Indeed, at long run (1960-90), it appears that the interest rate 
remains unchanged several years contrarily to the income variable and further that its changes 
reduce. The evolution of the interest rate on period 1960-74 differs from .that scenario. 
- Third, departing from the real balances equations one has also to investigate wether 
the interest rate is the proper variable to account for all sorts of cost to hold money. Indeed, 
expected inflation also increases the costs of holding money. This raises the question to know 
wether the expected rate of inflation has a separate influence (from the interest rate one) on 
the demand for money. In well-developed capital markets, in which interest rates are free to 
move to reflect expected inflation, the nominal interest rate is the relevant opportunity cost of 
holding money. That is because individuals could make investment”at that interest rate. In 
markets where interest rates are controlled, and rates do not rise to reflect expected inflation, 
individuals begin to think of the alternative of buying goods rather than holding money when 
the expected rate of inflation rises. The expected inflation rate itself then becomes a separate 
influence on the demand for money. France Modigliani has offered the following useful rule 
of thumb to decide wether the nominal interest rate or the expected rate of inflation should be 
included as determining the demand for money : if the nominal interest rate exceeds the 
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expected rate of inflation, the nominal interest rate should be thought of as the cost of holding 
money. When the opposite is true the expected inflation rate has to be used. 
39. The following led us to re-estimate the real balances demand equations by substituting 
expected inflation for the nominal interest rate. Indeed, in Ethiopia, interest rates were not free 
to move to reflect expected inflation on 1974-90. So, not all opportunity costs were accounted 
for through the nominal interest rate variable. The equations were specified as follows : 
(B) Mt = 64 Mt-1 + 65 (Y/p)t-2 t 66 Pt+l 
where : 
- Pt+l : the GDP deflator with a lead of one year. This variable is a proxy for the expected 
inflation rate. This was not the proper way to account for this one but it was the only way for 
which we got a relevant inflation impact. The results are shown at table 15 (model B). They 
indicate the following : 
(i) At long run (1960-90), the real income (always with a 2 years lag) and inflation 
elasticities remain garly the same”& absolute values (about 0.4). Differences are not very 
high compared to equations with nominal interest rate (about 0.3). That is the opposite for 
1974-90, the elasticities more than double (OS ; -0.6). The 1974-90 elasticities reflect very 
interestingly the known situation of 1974-90. Indeed, the interest rates were not free to move 
to reflect inflation (P grew of about 5.7% per year on 1973-80 and 2.0 from 1980-90 
compared to a nominal interest rate going from 2.09 : 1973 to 2.8 : 1980 and 3.0 : 1990). So, 
people became more sensitive to inflation than to interest rate as opportunity costs indicator to 
hold money. Further, the income elasticity increased (from 0.4 to 0.5) but this could be due to 
multicollinearity between real income and price. Although economic rationality would tell us 
that in case of increased inflation and frozen wage (since 1975) people would become more 
sensitive to real income. 
(ii) Again to be noticed the too high elasticities of the lagged explained variable (more than 
one). Most likely for the same reason as previously i.e transactions costs or other explanatory 
variables being included. 
40. In all the preceding equations, the elasticities to real income seeni’a little low compared to 
available studies on developing countries. Indeed, very often values greater than one were 
found after an adjustment process took place (reference framework elasticity of 1.5). This has 
led us to modify the equations so as to reduce the lagged money demand elasticity and so to 
be able to compute the long run adjustment process of money to real income. To get this result 
the inflation index was introduced with the interest rate. Further, we tried to compute the 
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transactions costs. TO do this we used the formula from the inventory approach. So b was 
computed as follows : 
b = fM*/(Y/p)]*2*i 
Then, b is a function of money demand, the interest rate and the velocity of money : 
b = (M/v)*2*i 
where v is the velocity of money or the (Y/p)/M ratio. Results are shown at table 16. They 
indicate : 
(i) an increase of all elasticities the lagged money demand one being excepted. This one has 
now an elasticity lower than unity. This leads to an adjustment process’through which : 
a- real income (always with a 2 years lag) gets a long run elasticity of about 2.1 on 
1974-90 and between 1.6 to 2.5 on 1960-90 ; 
b- the interest rate gets a long run elasticity of about -0.6 on 1974-90 and slightly above 
(-)unity on 1960-90 ; 
c- the “expected” inflation index gets a constant elasticity of about -1.0 ; 
d- the transactions costs (lagged 2 years) get a constant elasticity of about 0.6 ; 
e- no correct estimation were obtained for 1960-74. 
(ii) The specificity.:of period 1974% compared to that of 1960-9O’is the difference between 
the interest and inflation rates elasticities. Indeed, the inflation one is twice as high as the 
interest rate one while both get the same value on 1960-90. This indicates that people were 
aware of increased opportunity costs through expected inflation increase on 1974-90. So, they 
became less sensitive to the interest rate (being not adjusted for inflation) at the opposite with 
inflation. Globally, they became much more aware of the costs to hold money on 1974-90. 
(iii) Compared to the second equation, for 1960-90 (no P(+l) included), the 1974-90 period 
would also be featured by an increased real income elasticity. It could be explained by 
inflation increase and frozen nominal income i.e more sensitivity to real income in 
conjunction with a change of the money velocity. Indeed, this one decreases on this period. 
So, the elasticity to real income increases. 
41. “Armed” with all the preceding results, we tried again to get a money demand equation for 
, 1960-74 through a modified specification. In the new specified equation, all variables have 
been converted into index (1980 as base year). In this framework, one gets rather satisfactory 
results for 1960-74 i.e an income elasticity of about 1.9 and an inte& rate one of about -0.9. 
To notice that the income variable is no more lagged. The comparison of real income 
elasticities for the three periods (2.5 ; 2.1 ; 1.9) indicates that the 1960-90 elasticity could 
very well be too high. It should normally be between the related values for the sub-periods. 
This is likely due to the multicollinearity occuring between real income and the price variable. 
In this respect the value given by the second equation for 1960-90 (below 2) would seem 
much more plausible. Then one would get the following values after rounding: 
MbNEY DEMAND 
TABLE 16. RELEVANT ELASTlClTlES 
I 
1980.00 107440 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
SHORT RUN LONQ RUN SHORT RUN LONG RUN SHORT RUN LONG RUN. 
MONEY+1) 
GDP(-2) 
NOMINAL INTEREST RATE 
INFLATION(+l) 
COST OF TRANSACTING(-2) 
I32 VW 
D-W 
D-H ‘. 
Multkdllnearfty betweek 
0.79 0.75 0.71 
0.52 0.40 0.82 
-0.22 a.28 -0.18 
-0.21 6.34 
0.12 0.13 (I .3%) 0.52 0.17 
El 
1.00 1.00 
_. 
6.41 
2.00 2.37 
-0.22 - 
cost of transacting(-2) & money(-1) (4) cost of transacting(-2) & money(-1) (4) cost of transactlng(-2) & money(-1) (4) 
gdp(-2) & lnflatlon (~0) gdp(-2) & interest rate (4) gdp(-2) & Inflation (4) 
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EXPLANATORY 1960-90 1974-90 1960-74 
VARIABLES 
REAL INCOME < 2.0 > 2.0 < 2.0 
INTEREST RATE x-1.0 -0.6 s-1.0 
TRANSACTION COSTS 0.5 0.6 
INFLATION <-1.0 
42. To conclude: 
(i) At long run 1960-90 (when mixing the results) real balances could get : 
l- a real income elasticity of about 2.0 ; 
2- an interest rate elasticity of about -1.0 ; 
3- an expected inflation elasticity of about -1.0 (but to notice the low confidence 
level for this elasticity nevertheless) ; 
4- a transaction costs elasticity less than one ; 
S- both the real income and the transactions costs would be two years lagged 
variables, the exception being 1960-74 for the former. 
(ii) Departing from these results, &&pia real balances get higher income elasticity than the 
IMF’s study (2.0 compared to 1.5). The interest rate one is lower (-1.0 compared to -0.32). 
II-6) CAPITAL MARKET OR FLEXIBILTY 
43. As indicated previously the real balances demand equation has been used to get some 
information on what could be the Ethiopian capital market flexibility. At this aim, a &UIQX 
money supply that is with no private capital flows was computed and substituted for money 
demand in the real balances equation. The resulting equation solved for the interest rate gives 
a shadow interest one. This means an interest rate that would prevail in an economy where the 
effects of current private capital flows on the central bank’s stock of foreign exchange reserves 
are removed. The shadow interest is then introduced in a domestic interest rate equation with 
an international interest rate variable and one for rational expectations on the exchange rate. 
This specification allows to test for the effective degree of capital mobility in the economy. If 
capital is perfectly mobile, nominal interest rate is determined by “the interest rate parity 
condition that equates the domestic nominal interest rate to the sum of the nominal rate 
prevailing abroad and the expected change in the value of the domestic currency (uncovered 
interest parity). In a completely closed economy, nominal interest rate has no relationship to 
external rate and is determined purely in domestic markets. Edwards and Khan (1985) 
proposed to specify the domestic interest rate as follows : 
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Etet+i - et 
it = 4 (it* + ) + (l-4)rt 
et 
where : 
-i : the nominal Ethiopian interest rate ; 
- i* : the international interest rate ; 
&et+1 - et 
- -------- : rational expectations on the exchange rate (et) ; 
et 
-i : the shadow interest rate. 
Within such an equation, Q, is a capital mobility index ranging between zero and unity. When 
@=l it is implied that the domestic interest rate is determined by the uncovered interest parity 
condition, and thus corresponds to perfect capital mobility. The opposite is true with @=O. 
Then, the domestic interest rate is the shadow one. As @ increases from 0 to 1, the degree of 
capital mobility increases, since the interest rate approaches its uncovered parity value. In 
these intermediate cases the equil&&m interest rate is determined by a combination of 
domestic and external factor( 
44. Our equations were specified as follows 
Etet+i - et 
it-it = 4 ( it* + - ft ) 
et 
where : 
- it : the shadow interest rate computed from the LM curve derived from the real 
balances demand equations for 1960-90 and 1974-90 periods ; 
- it* : the US rate ; 
I Etetti - et 
- ------- : Uncovered parity condition linking it 
et ,, -a. 
and it* or the terminal and spot markets with respect o the exchange rate. 
(11) Paragraph quoted from the IMP’s paper on p 544. 
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The estimations show : 
(i) a capital flexibility index ranging from 0.75 to 0.85 depending on wether the LM curve 
was obtained from model A (table 15) or equations from table 16. This suggests that capital 
flows were not perfectly mobile in Ethiopia at long run. Compared to the IMFs study (index 
of about l), Ethiopian capital flows were less mobile. Compared to other studies, for instance 
that on the Franc zone (index ranging from 0.7 to O.8)(12) they were on line with capital 
flexibility in very poor countries. 
(ii) no appreciable difference between the three periods. Indeed, the equations from model A 
show a value of 0.75 both for 1960-90 and 1974-90 while the other ones.give 0.85 for 1960- 
90,0.89 for 1974-90 and 0.85 for 1960-74. 
(iii) a lack of difference between the three periods which indicates that contrarily to what 
could be expected the marxist regime of 1974-90 did not modify fundamentally the past 
capital market behaviour in Ethiopia although it could have re-inforced its weakness. 
(12) Estimation obtained by N. Troubat being a DL4L’s trainee in 1991. References [5). 
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CONCLUSIONS: 
45. Although being biased because of econometric, statistical and economical problems 
encountered pleading for furthur research the results one gets are interesting. They indicate 
that : 
l- Poverty is an issue which has to be touched as such through the EPTP for income 
cannot grow for the present as high as demography. 
2- It is relevant to carefully investigate the question of the Birr parity change for 
expected growth to ‘come could ‘v&ii well be just a dream if peasants cannot get some 2: 
appreciable and sustainable improvement of the living standard i.e their income. 
3- Price stabilization matters much than positive real interest rate when the focus is on 
poverty, the normal state of 60 per cent of the Ethiopian population. 
4- In Ethiopia, the IS curve is flat and the LM one steep. This is because investment is 
very sensitive to the interest rate (elasticity of about I-1.5) and real balances to real income 
(elasticity of about 2.0). Then, in the eventuality of an austerity monetary policy, nominal 
interest rate would increase at given real income because a decrease of real money supply 
shifts the LM curve out to the left. The LM curve would thus cut the IS one at a lower real 
income level. Given the high elasticity of IS to the interest rate, the real income decrease 
would be very high. This indicates that the only way to soften this depressing effect would be 
to get capital inflows in response to the nominal interest rate increase. The preceding should 
lead the government o carefully investigate: 
(i) the available saving of the informal sector ; .* -” 
(ii) how to reach an agreement with this sector (which dominates the Chamber of 
Commerce) to create private banks leading to positive real interest rate and capital inflows. 
5- A steep LM curve also implies some comparative effectiveness of monetary policy 
over fiscal policy even if a change to the later one is strongly advocated by the private sector. 
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6- Capital market flexibility is not abnormal in Ethiopia in the light of African studies. 
It is that of a very poor country, simply. This indicates again that the government should focus 
on poverty as such. 
7- All the preceding pleads for the international donors community being aware that 
poverty to alleviate should be the main focus of action even if it leads to a regulated 
e of the Western . 
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